Working principle: Where the adversary repeats himself, prediction becomes possible. These are observed asymmetries from OSINT reading — useful for orientation, not for forecasts without verification.
Working principle, restated: When the adversary behaves consistently — same launch sites, same seasonal patterns, same political timing, same composition drift — those regularities are exploitable. Either by defenders (knowing what to prepare for) or by analysts (knowing what to look for). The value of pattern recognition isn't certainty about the future; it's reducing the surface area of "could be anything" to "most likely these three things." Always look for the asymmetry first.
Tripwires are events that, if they occurred, would change your assessment of the threat picture. The five below are reasonable starting points based on Norwegian defence concerns. Replace them with your own.
Why this section is in beta: Real tripwires are professional judgments about what would change your assessment. The five above are starters. You and your boss should review, edit, replace. The framework is the value; the specific tripwires need analyst ownership.
The question: Is Russia building drones faster than Ukraine can destroy them? If yes, stockpile grows and Russia can escalate. If no, attrition wins.
Current best estimate (treat as illustrative):
Why this section is in beta: Russian production figures come from Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) estimates of Alabuga plant capacity, which Russia obviously doesn't confirm. UA destruction includes ground strikes on Russian storage facilities — visible in OSINT but counts are fuzzy. The chart trend is directionally reliable; the absolute numbers should not be quoted in any consulting work without independent verification.
People making decisions on the Russian drone program. This information ages within weeks — Russian general officers get promoted, sacked, or relocated regularly. Cross-reference any name with current OSINT before citing.
Why this section is in beta: Adversary information requires regular updating from active OSINT (sanctions filings, defence reporting, named-source journalism). My initial sourcing here is from 2024–early 2025 reporting. Without weekly maintenance this section becomes misinformation. Iterate with your boss on whether the value of tracking named adversaries justifies the maintenance burden.
Thought-experiment, not formal analysis. The playbook below sketches what Norway might see in early stages of various drone-warfare scenarios. These are indicators to watch for, not predictions. Real Norwegian defence analysis should be done by Norwegian defence professionals — these starter scenarios exist for you to challenge, replace, or refine with your boss.
Why this section is in beta: Real threat playbooks come from defence professionals with classified context, war-gaming experience, and accountability for the judgments. I am a language model producing reasonable-sounding scenarios from public reading. These are starting points for discussion, never conclusions. The most valuable thing this section can do is provoke your boss to say "here's where you're wrong, here's what we actually watch."